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Background: Despite limited evidence of its effectiveness, performance-based payments (P4P) are seen by leading
policymakers as a potential solution to the slow progress in reaching Millennium Development Goal 5: improved
maternal health. This paper offers insights into two of the aspects that are lacking in the current literature on P4P,
namely what strategies health workers employ to reach set targets, and how the intervention plays out when
implemented by local government as part of a national programme that does not receive donor funding.
Methods: A total of 28 in-depth interviews (IDIs) with 25 individuals were conducted in Mvomero district over
a period of 15 months in 2010 and 2011, both before and after P4P payments. Seven facilities, including six
dispensaries and one health centre, were covered. Informants included 17 nurses, three clinical officers, two medical
attendants, one lab technician and two district health administrators.
Results: Health workers reported a number of strategies to increase the number of deliveries at their facility,
including health education and cooperation with traditional health providers. The staff at all facilities also reported
that they had told the women that they would be sanctioned if they gave birth at home, such as being fined or
denied clinical cards and/or vaccinations for their babies. There is a great uncertainty in relation to the potential
health impacts of the behavioural changes that have come with P4P, as the reported strategies may increase the
numbers, but not necessarily the quality. Contrary to the design of the P4P programme, payments were not based
on performance. We argue that this was due in part to a lack of resources within the District Administration, and in
part as a result of egalitarian fairness principles.
Conclusions: Our results suggest that particular attention should be paid to adverse effects when using external
rewards for improved health outcomes, and secondly, that P4P may take on a different form when implemented by
local implementers without the assistance of professional P4P specialists.
Keywords: Payment for performance, Results-based financing, Motivation, Tanzania, Mvomero, Home birth, Working
conditions, Public health, Reproductive health, Maternal health* Correspondence: victor.chimhutu@hemil.uib.no
1Department of Health Promotion and Development (HEMIL), University of
Bergen, P.O. Box 7807, Bergen 5020, Norway
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2014 Chimhutu et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Chimhutu et al. BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:23 Page 2 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/23Background
Performance-based payments (P4P) are seen by leading
policymakers as a potential solution to the slow progress
in achieving the main target of Millennium Development
Goal 5: reducing the maternal mortality ratio by two-
thirds by 2015 [1-3]. The basic principle behind P4P is
that payments are contingent on performance. For ex-
ample, an increase in the utilization of health services
can trigger a bonus to the responsible health workers/
managers [4]. It is assumed that payments to health-care
providers will induce them to offer maternal health-care
services of a higher quality, and that this in turn will in-
crease the number of women and children who receive
high-quality care. In Africa, 17 countries are now imple-
menting P4P, 14 of them as pilots, and three as nation-
wide programmes [5].
Critics argue that P4P need not result in improved
health outcomes, and that it can have adverse effects
[6-10]. In particular, P4P may crowd out motivation
and/or attention for tasks for which health workers are
not paid. Health workers may also play with the books
and alter numbers and not behaviour. Lastly, P4P pro-
grammes are criticized for focusing on the quantity- ra-
ther than the quality of care.
Proponents of P4P refer to a relatively limited number
of studies that demonstrate that P4P can have a substan-
tial effect on the utilization of health-care services and
to some extent on health outcomes [11-15]. A weakness
of these studies, however, is that they do not tell us pre-
cisely how or why these changes take place. If we obtain
a better understanding of what health providers think
about P4P programmes [16], and what they actually do
to make changes occur, it will help us shed some light
on any potential adverse effects, as well as helping us
understand why P4P appears to work well in some set-
tings and not in others.
The majority of P4P studies that have found positive
results in terms of utilization and/or outcomes have
used data from programmes in which substantial tech-
nical and managerial resources accompany the interven-
tion. In countries with weak health sector institutions,
this is unlikely to be the case during nationwide roll-out
organized by both national and local governments. It is
therefore important to also study interventions that are
implemented by governments in low-income countries
using their own resources.
This paper offers insights into two of the aspects lack-
ing in the current literature on P4P: Why changes may
occur in response to the introduction of P4P, and how
the intervention plays out when implemented by local
government as part of a national programme that does
not receive donor funding. The paper is structured as fol-
lows: The first section looks at the underlying conceptual
framework of P4P, while the second section describes thenationally funded P4P programme in Tanzania. The third
section lays out the methods that we employed, whereas
the fourth section reports on the findings from the in-
depth interviews with health workers and health adminis-
trators. The fifth and sixth sections offer a discussion of
the results and concluding remarks.
Conceptual framework
Payment for performance (P4P), or performance-based
payment (PBP), can be defined as: “the transfer of money
or material goods conditional upon taking a measurable
action or achieving a predetermined performance target”
[17]. Underlying P4P is the principal-agent model. The
principle behind this model is that there is a lack of
alignment of the preferences (interests) of the principal
(employer) and the agent (employee) when it comes to
the goals to be achieved by an organization. The princi-
pal therefore attempts to find ways of aligning the
agent’s goals to the goals of the organization [18]. In the
context of P4P, health workers, or ‘agents’, are provided
with performance bonuses by the principal in order to
achieve health outputs and outcomes.
Nevertheless, even if a health worker is strongly moti-
vated by the reward the principal offers and changes his
behaviour in response, the intervention may not neces-
sarily improve health outcomes.
First, financial incentives may crowd out attention to
tasks important for high-quality care. Health workers
may focus on aspects of health care for which they are
rewarded, while ignoring other aspects of care for which
they are not rewarded yet are nonetheless important for
quality [7]. Holmstrom and Milgrom coin the former type
of behaviour multitasking, and argue that financial incen-
tives may not be very effective in the health sector, as em-
ployers pay for input rather than for health outcomes [19].
Second, external rewards may crowd out health workers’
intrinsic motivation to do the job [20]. Clearly, if health
workers were intrinsically motivated to deliver high-quality
health care, there would be no need for employing finan-
cial incentives as a motivator. Studies comparing what
health workers in low-income countries can do with what
they actually do [21-23] suggest that the intrinsic motiv-
ation for the average health worker is low. However, the
use of external rewards may still crowd out the motivation
for those health workers who are intrinsically motivated,
and if the use of external rewards for some reason is dis-
continued, motivation and effort may end up being lower
than before these rewards were introduced.
Third, P4P is vulnerable to corruption, i.e. health workers
may be changing the numbers rather than the indicators
themselves (see Oxman and Fretheim for a review of ad-
verse effects [6]. Fourth, a major assumption of P4P is that
workers are able to offer high-quality care if they choose
to. This may not be the case, as knowledge of guidelines
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equate. Lastly, P4P presupposes that if health workers de-
liver high-quality care, women will come to the facility.
This may not be the case since women may deliver at
home for reasons outside the control of health workers.
In conclusion then, agency theory tells us that offering
health workers an incentive for an increase in the num-
ber of deliveries need not result in improved health
outcomes, primarily because the incentive is related to
effort and not to outcomes.
P4P in a Tanzanian context
The productivity of health workers in Tanzania has been
proven to be low. One study shows that less than 60% of
working hours are used for productive activities, ([24]:3)
whereas another demonstrates that few health workers
follow clinical guidelines, and that low motivation is a cen-
tral factor [23]. Lastly, a number of studies have shown
that health workers in Tanzania are unhappy with their
working environment and their salaries [25,26].
Norway, one of Tanzania’s long-term development part-
ners, took a leading role in introducing the idea of result-
based financing in the country’s health sector in 2008
[2,27]. The government of Tanzania was very receptive to
the idea and wanted to launch a national P4P pilot
programme in 2009 [28]. Tanzania’s development partners
in the health sector were reluctant to endorse the idea due
to many contested issues. First, there was a strong feeling
that the state of Tanzania’s health management informa-
tion system (HMIS) was not ready for P4P, which had
been documented in an appraisal study carried out in
2009 [2]. Second, other perceived preconditions for a
successful P4P, such as a satisfactory staff situation and
adequate access to essential drugs, equipment and sup-
plies, were lacking [2]. The government of Tanzania was
therefore not allowed to use the funds in the health
basket earmarked for P4P. While acknowledging that
the proper conditions for P4P were lacking, the govern-
ment of Tanzania proceeded with the implementation of
P4P in 2009, choosing to employ a ‘learning by doing
approach’ [28].
The donor community requested that the government
of Tanzania halt P4P [27]. At this point, however, the
government of Tanzania had already issued a directive
that P4P should be included as an activity in the dis-
tricts’ Comprehensive Council Health Plan (CCHP) for
2009/10. Even so, not all the districts followed the dir-
ective, and in some places health workers were eagerly
awaiting a P4P programme that was never implemented
[29]. On the other hand, the district administration in
Mvomero District decided to follow the directive and P4P
was consequently budgeted for in the health plan and im-
plemented in 2009, and health workers received their first
bonuses in 2010. To distinguish the P4P scheme that westudy from the donor-funded scheme which was later
launched as a pilot in Pwani Region in 2011 [30], we will
refer to it as the ‘locally funded P4P’.
The design of the locally funded P4P in Tanzania
(2009–2011)
The main aim of the locally funded P4P in Tanzania was
to “provide better motivation and explicit attention to re-
sults, by ensuring that health workers and their supervi-
sors are motivated to strive for better results in Maternal,
Newborn and Child Health Services and other health ser-
vices in the districts” [28]. The bonuses were to be paid
based on achievements using the following indicators:
antenatal care, institutional deliveries, post-natal care, and
Health Management Information Systems (HMIS). Coun-
cil Health Management Teams (CHMTs) were to monitor
and ensure that health facilities in their mandated area
were submitting their reports in time, and they were also
to review and verify the reports. In turn, the CHMTs were
to be monitored by the Regional Health Management
Teams (RHMTs) [31].
At the facility level, a maximum annual bonus was to
be achieved if the facility met all the targets for all the
indicators, whereas a partial bonus was to be paid if only
some of the targets were met. For deliveries, the target
for dispensaries was that 60% or more of all the expected
deliveries of the catchment area should take place at the
dispensary. At the national level, 51% of all women with
a live birth received delivery care from a skilled provider
in 2010, although the percentages vary between 21% and
91% across regions [32]. New targets were to be set at
the beginning of each year and the basic rule for target
setting was the requirement of improvements from the
previous performance [31]. Furthermore, the bonuses
were to differ according to facility type. Dispensaries had
a maximum bonus limit of T.Shs 1 million (approximately
USD 676) and health centres, CHMTs and RHMTs’ max-
imum annual bonus was T.Shs 3 million (USD 2,000),
while hospitals had the highest maximum annual bonus of
T.Shs 9 million (USD 6,000). Payments at the health facil-
ity were to be shared equally among the staff regardless of
grade, qualifications or position. If a health facility reached
all targets, each individual was supposed to get a max-




The study was conducted in Mvomero, a rural district in
the Morogoro Region of Tanzania. The district covers
more than 7,000 square kilometres, and the population
is approximately 300,000. Administratively, Mvomero is
divided into 17 wards and 101 villages. There are 56
health facilities in the district, including three hospitals,
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10 live births in the region are delivered by a skilled pro-
vider [32]. Except for a woman’s first delivery and her
fifth delivery and upwards (which should take place at a
hospital), Tanzanian health authorities recommend that
women with uncomplicated pregnancies who have gone
through regular antenatal care deliver at their closest
dispensary. Dispensaries are usually headed by a Clin-
ical Officer (three years of medical training). As a gen-
eral rule, nurses are in charge of deliveries, but the
Clinical Officer will be asked to assist if a delivery does
not proceed normally.
Data collection and analysis
Since we were interested in health workers’ perceptions
and experiences with P4P, as well as their strategies to
meet set targets, we chose individual interviews as our
primary methodology. Moreover, because nurses are in
charge of the majority of services targeted by the locally
funded P4P (antenatal care, deliveries, postnatal care
and vaccinations), we focused on this profession. In June
2010, when P4P had been introduced but payments had
not yet been made, the first author conducted 12 in-
depth interviews with health workers at four public dis-
pensaries and one faith-based health centre (10 nurses,
one medical attendant and one lab assistant). The inter-
view guide was informed by the existing literature on
P4P and focused on expectations related to the introduc-
tion of P4P, including the potential effect of P4P on the
prioritization of work within the health facility, nurses’
perceptions and experiences of midwifery and provision
of care, in addition to perceptions about the access to-,
acceptability of- and quality of care provided to women
in childbirth.
In October 2011, after health workers had received their
first bonus payments, the third author conducted a total
of 14 IDIs with health workers at five public dispensaries
(including a total of three clinical officers, 10 nurses and
one medical attendant). Three of the facilities and three of
the nurses had been part of the 2010 study. The interview
guide covered the following themes: health worker’s
knowledge about the P4P scheme (goals, rewarded tasks),
actions that had been taken to reach the goals (particu-
larly in relation to increasing deliveries), multitasking,
perceptions about the bonus that had been received and
how it had been spent, and the perceived effects on co-
operation within the facility and communication with
the district authorities.
Health workers were specifically asked about sanctions
against women who give birth at home. The background
for including this question was information that we had
gained through focus group discussions (FDGs), which
were conducted with the help of research assistants in
the period from July to early October 2011. A total of 11focus group discussions (six with women, five with men)
in four different villages were conducted, focusing on
the perceptions of maternal health services in the district
and the potential benefits and challenges of P4P. Due to
the scope of the journal article format, the findings of
the FDGs will not be included here. However, the FDGs
provided important background information for our IDIs
with health workers. For example, we learned from two
of the FDGs that health workers had announced that any
woman who gave birth at home would be fined. Hence,
health workers were asked about fining and other forms
of sanctions directed at home births.
The health facilities were located between one and three
hours by car from each other, mostly in different wards.
The facilities were partially on the basis of acquaintance
through previous visits, which improved their rapport with
informants, and partially on the basis of convenience. In
general, all the health workers who were present at a given
facility at the time of the fieldwork were interviewed.
In addition to IDIs with health workers and FDGs with
community members, we carried out individual in-depth
interviews with two district health administrators, includ-
ing the District Medical Officer. The interviews focused
on the process of implementing the government funded
P4P, including lessons learned and the reasons why the
scheme was discontinued.
All interviews were conducted in Swahili. The first au-
thor speaks Swahili on a high level, while the third author
is fluent in the language and has conducted a number of
long-term ethnographic fieldworks in Tanzania over a
period of 20 years. All IDIs were recorded, transcribed
and translated to English. In addition, rapid note taking
during interviews was done. The third author checked all
transcripts and verified the translations. The study used
meaning condensation as the mode of analysis [34], which
was assisted by the use of software OpenCode 3.6. The
transcripts were subjected to a thorough review and sys-
tematic coding. After coding, the content was assigned to
categories, and central themes were identified from these
categories. During the course of the study, relevant na-
tional policy and design documents by the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare were reviewed in a systematic
manner, including the Payment for performance strategy
[28], the Implementation guidelines for payment for per-
formance [35] and the Results-based bonus design, imple-
mentation and budget [31].
Research ethics
Research clearance was granted in Norway through the
Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) and in
Tanzania through the Ifakara Institutional Review Board
(IHI-IRB), the National Institute for Medical Research
(NIMR) and the Commission for Science and Technol-
ogy (COSTECH), and oral consent was given. We have
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by letters and the informants by title.
Results
Bonuses were given at a flat rate, yet health workers
were satisfied with the payments
The P4P bonuses in Mvomero were paid in February
2011. The District Medical Officer (DMO) and the Dis-
trict Treasurer turned up at each facility and distributed
the money in cash. Even though health workers had been
told that payments were contingent on performance be-
forehand, this turned out not to be the case. In contrast to
the way that the P4P programme was designed (presented
above), the bonus was given at a flat rate and was unre-
lated to the actual results. Nevertheless, we observed that
although payments failed to be contingent on perform-
ance, we can still expect the scheme to have worked as
performance pay, as long as health workers thought pay-
ments would be contingent on performance. However,
future effects are another matter entirely. The district ad-
ministration gave the following reason for paying the bo-
nuses at a flat rate:
In 2009–10 we paid all facilities, they all qualified.
We saw how many vaccinations they had given, if they
had brought the reports timely, etc. We also looked at
deliveries. Some people qualified in some respects and
not in others, and since this was like a motivation for
the employees, we just paid all the facilities the same
amount (…). For the case of last year, we were not able
to pay P4P because it was not in the budget (a new
ambulance was prioritized). If we had continued with
P4P we would have been stricter, we would have put
more efforts to check whether they had really improved
or not. (District Administrator, 2011)
Each dispensary was given T.Shs 500,000, while each
health centre was given T.Shs 700,000 to be equally
distributed to all staff members at the facility regardless
of rank. These bonuses were approximately 50% of the
maximum bonuses stated in the P4P planning docu-
ments. Depending on the number of staff who shared
the bonus at each facility, the actual sums that individual
health workers received varied considerably between the
facilities we visited, from T.Shs 18,000 to T.Shs 169,000,
with the vast majority receiving more than T.Shs 100,000.
In comparison, interviewees had a take home monthly sal-
ary varying between T.Shs 380,000 to 450,000. The bonus
thus constituted 5-40% of what health workers would
usually receive per month. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that many of our informants had taken loans to
finance their children’s education, and after the deduc-
tions of these loans the performance bonuses were even
more significant. The majority of the health workersused the bonus for their daily requirements, while three
had used the money to move one of their children to a
school that was either of higher quality and/or closer to
where they worked.
Informants expressed gratitude for having received the
payments. While many said that it was “like a dream”,
something that they had hoped for but not fully trusted
that they would receive (due to a prior experience of non-
payment of allowances), others expressed that they had
been quite confident that they would get the bonus:
I wasn’t surprised, as we were told that if we do well
this would follow. (Nurse 3, Dispensary C, 2011,
received 60,000)
Some respondents brought in the question of unpaid
overtime, saying that P4P showed that the government
actually cares about them after all:
I think P4P is good because it motivates the workers and
makes them realize that the government cares about
them. (CO, Dispensary C, 2011, received 169,000)
While some informants hinted that the bonus should
preferably have been a bit higher, others emphasized that
the bonus was a gift (zawadi) and not part of their regu-
lar salary, and therefore not something that they could
demand:
I was so glad to see that our superiors considered us,
the people at the bottom. (…) And whatever a father
decides to give to his son – that is something that
cannot be forced. Personally, therefore, I am so happy
to have received that reward and I saw the sum as large
and satisfactory because I did not expect it to happen.
(Nurse 2, Dispensary B, 2011, received 100,000)
None of the interviewed health workers had been in-
formed about the discontinuation of P4P, and many said
that they expected new bonus payments to be made.
The district administration confirmed that they had not
sent out any written information about the discontinu-
ation of the scheme, but that they had attempted to or-
ally inform health workers during supervisions.
Attitudes toward alternative usage of the funds changed
after payments were made
In 2010, before the bonus payments had been made, a
good number of our informants expressed scepticism to-
wards the idea of P4P. Some informants warned against
rewarding health workers in isolation:
P4P is just addressing health workers, but we do not
work alone or with no assistance. For example, we are
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traditional healers. But if the government had said,
OK, we have some incentives for these traditional
health workers…ohh surely we would not miss these
targets. (Nurse 1, Dispensary D, 2010)
In 2011, a number of our informants said that they
had approached Traditional Birth Attendants (TBA) to
encourage them to bring women in labour to a health
facility, though none argued that TBAs or healers should
be given P4P. Another area where the tone has changed
is the question of equipment. A number of studies have
shown that dispensaries in Tanzania often lack equip-
ment and medicines, and health workers often identify a
lack of laboratories as a major hindrance for offering
quality care [23]. In 2010, some informants argued that
the resources that were to be spent on P4P would have
little effect if the equipment situation was not improved
as well:
I think P4P will help, but first of all the equipment
situation at the facilities has to improve. You
know, so that P4P can be successful. But if there
is no equipment, we will not be able to give the
proper treatment and care needed, and then
you can’t reach the target. (Nurse 1, Dispensary
C, 2010)
After the bonus payments had been made, however, all
but one of our informants were in favour of this way of
spending health funds. When asked whether some of the
money should instead be used for equipment, the re-
spondent quoted above had this to say:
The fact is that it (P4P) is a good approach. It’s an
encouragement since working in a village is tedious.
Therefore, when they decided to encourage us ….that
was really motivating. It should be continued and
it shouldn’t be stopped (in favour of buying
equipment). (Nurse 1, Dispensary C, 2011, received
T.Shs 38,000)
Other informants were more outspoken when arguing
that P4P was a good investment compared to spending
money on equipment:
Equipment…? For what? We’re really not in need of
equipment. (Nurse 1, Dispensary A, 2011, received T.
Shs 125,000)
In 2010, some informants expressed concerns that
P4P could lead to unethical behaviour in health care.
These health workers felt that P4P was aiming at mak-
ing them more result-oriented, thereby forcing them toprioritize results over quality care. One nurse expressed
this reservation in the following way:
It is not good to use targets. For example, if you are
told to treat 100 patients per day, I don’t think you
will treat them accordingly, you will just rush them to
reach the right number. I don’t think it’s a good idea
to put targets in health care. (Lab Assistant, faith
based Health Centre, 2010)
When asked whether the forging of data was another
possible pitfall of P4P, several informants agreed that this
could be a real danger:
They have to think of something that can motivate us
and not the P4P-way which says ‘when you produce
this, then we will give you a bonus’. I think it creates
problems where people will forge data at health facilities
to meet the target. (Nurse 1, Dispensary A, 2010)
In 2011, the tone had changed considerably. While the
above informant said that there may be a chance of for-
gery since “people need money and some aren’t trust
worthy”, the great majority argued strongly that for prac-
tical reasons forging data is impossible. Similarly, while
many informants agreed in 2010 that P4P might make
health workers concentrate on tasks that are rewarded at
the expense of other tasks (crowding out), no informants
saw this as a problem in 2011.
Informants claim that P4P has improved services,
enhanced cooperation and fostered a spirit of
competition
Many informants view P4P as a competition between
health facilities. They feel that in order to attract clients,
they need to offer better services than other primary
health facilities in the same area. In the words of one
clinical officer:
P4P is part of a competition and every person wants to
be a winner. (…) We have several health facilities and
we have the same design and the same indicators, and
most health workers will say ‘why not here’? Every
health facility will want to score better than the other.
Due to that spirit, some changes will happen in health
service provision. (CO, Dispensary A, 2010)
In 2011, when asked whether P4P had entailed competi-
tion between facilities, several informants argued that P4P
had indeed improved services and that their facility now
attracted patients from outside of their catchment area:
P4P has made people be more thorough in the work
that they do. Patients decide to go where they find the
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aren’t happy with the services elsewhere and they
come to our facility for better treatment. We get
expecting mothers who were supposed to be treated at
Mkindo, but we can’t tell them to go back. (Nurse 1,
Dispensary A, 2011)
Poor staff attitudes have been noted in the literature as
one of the reasons why expectant mothers prefer to de-
liver at home without assistance from qualified personnel
as opposed to facility delivery. In 2010, nurses explained
that they sometimes had to “be a bit hard” on women who
were delivering or to raise their voice:
You know patients are so different and difficult. A
mother may come in the labour room at the stage of
contractions. Some of them get confused, so when you
try to tell her something and she doesn’t understand or
refuse […] then sometimes you have to be a little bit
hard on her. This is to avoid infections and to help her
deliver the baby safely. (Assistant Nurse 1, Dispensary
B, 2010)
In 2011, nurses still argued that they often needed to
be strict with women who come to give birth, that
women could not choose birthing position but had to lie
down on the delivery bed, and that they would generally
not allow relatives to enter the delivery room. At the
same time, positive staff attitudes were seen by health
workers as one of the strategies to increase service
utilization, which would again enable them to meet P4P
targets. As one medical attendant puts it:
If you are being given incentives you need to realize
that you must have good attitudes towards work and
desist from bad behavior, like using bad language to
clients. If you do not change you will let your
workmates down. (Medical Attendant 1, Dispensary C,
2011, received T.Shs 18,000)
P4P then, appears to have encouraged unity of purpose
at the health facility level since the programme was
designed to offer incentives to individuals as a result of
team performance.
Strategies to make women deliver at facilities
An important aim of the second round of interviews was
to find out what measures, if any, health workers had taken
to make more women deliver at their facilities. Some infor-
mants say that they have increased outreach activities and
sensitized women on the dangers of giving birth at home:
They (women) come here because we sensitize
expecting mothers (…) We tell them that here theequipment is sterilized well compared to that used at
home, which is not sterilized. They just hang the gloves
to dry which is very risky, it can lead to AIDS
transmission. Once they hear that they can get AIDS,
they come in large numbers. (Registered Nurse 3,
Dispensary C, 2011, received T.Shs 60,000)
One informant said that such health education made
some women decide to deliver at a health facility, even
if her husband or relatives did not see the importance
and wanted her to deliver at home. However, the need
to attract more clients in order to reach P4P targets
has entailed that many health facilities in the district
have developed negative strategies to attract and/or
force clients to utilize their services. In fact, the staff
at all of the five facilities we visited in 2011 admitted
that women had either been told that they would be
fined if they delivered at home, or that they would be
denied a live birth card and/or vaccination for their
newborn.
As for fining, focus group participants in the catch-
ment areas of dispensaries E and F told us that health
workers had announced that women who delivered at
home would be fined T.Shs 10,000. The health workers
we interviewed confirmed that this had been announced,
but that it was only a threat, and not something that was
actually carried out:
Last year there was a clinical officer who used to tell
women that if they give birth at home they will be
charged a fine, and that they should come to give birth
at the dispensary because it is free of charge. He was
just saying that to scare them. (…) If you tell them
that, they are afraid to get the fine. So up till this day
there is no one who gives birth at home. (Assistant
Nurse 2, Dispensary F, 2011)
The reason why the fining had not been carried out
was that in order to actually fine someone, one would
need to involve the Village Government, which had not
yet been done. The health workers got the idea to
criminalize home birth from colleagues from a neigh-
bouring district, Morogoro Rural, where fines for home
birth had been passed as a by-law by local authorities:
When we go for seminars we sometimes ask what
others do to sensitize the people. So whatever you
hear from others, if you haven’t tried it yet, then you
should also attempt it to see how it works, (…) but
only after involving the village leaders. There are some
things - even if it hasn’t been decided at the district
level – that we can make a decision about and then
involve the village leadership. (Registered Nurse 1,
Dispensary E, 2011)
Chimhutu et al. BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:23 Page 8 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/23Other health workers argued against fining, but were
positive towards other forms of sanctions:
I don’t think fining the mother is a good approach. We
should rather educate women by telling them the
consequences of delivering at home. There are many
ways to mobilize them like telling them that they won’t
be given a birth card at the dispensary (…). Instead
they will have to get it from the Ward Executive
Officer, a more tasking process. If she doesn’t do that,
she will end up not getting a clinic card for the baby.
We can manage to mobilize them to a large extent
using these threats. (Nurse 3, Dispensary C, 2011)
Also in this case, the strategy was something the health
workers had learned from others:
We heard that at “Dispensary B” they have more
deliveries these days, so we asked ourselves how are
they doing it? How come they are getting safe
deliveries, how are they doing it? We investigated how
they succeed to have safe deliveries. How come there
are fewer midwives, but they perform better? (…) After
inquiring about their successes we are now educating
our colleagues. (…) If she won’t deliver here, then she
won’t get a clinical card for the baby. So it is just an
educational competition. But there is no forcing of the
mothers. (Nurse 2, Dispensary C, 2011)
At dispensary A, the same approach had been adopted,
but the informant felt that it hadn’t had the expected
outcome:
We said that for those who deliver at home - their ba-
bies won’t be vaccinated and the babies won’t get clin-
ical cards, but they still continued to deliver at home.
Maybe we should look for other means, like fining
them. We should tell them that those who deliver at
home will be fined. (Nurse 1, Dispensary A, 2011)
Health workers, particularly those with a low level of
education, appeared to have little scruples about sanc-
tioning women who deliver at home. The various
methods were weighted against each other on the basis
of the degree to which they were feasible in practice. A
medical attendant had the following response to whether
fining would be a good way to make women deliver at a
facility or not:
The community here is different from that one
(where they fine patients). Here, people are quite tricky
- just a minor thing and he/she will go to the village
administration or to the Councillor to report! You ask
yourself why you should cause all that? (…) But finingis good (…), since to be fined - when even money for
food is a problem - they will just decide to do what they
are told. (Medical Attendant 1, Dispensary C, 2011)
When we asked the district health authorities what they
thought about strategies such as fining, their response re-
vealed that they were ambivalent and undecided, and that
they did not appear to do anything about these practices:
I don’t know much about it. It is not according to the
government guidelines, we don’t have any regulations
on that. But people say it helps (…). On the other
hand, if the woman doesn’t have the 10,000 shillings
she will not take her child to the clinic (for
vaccinations, in fear of the fine). (Official from district
health office, 2011)
The fact that the council health management team
(CHMT) also benefits from health facilities’ good per-
formance may be one reason why the monitoring and
follow-up of such practices is limited.
Discussion
Our findings suggest that health workers did alter their
behaviour in response to the intervention. However, to
shed further light on how the intervention worked, two
questions warrant further discussion: Why did health
workers focus on coercive methods to increase deliveries
at facilities? And why didn’t the local authorities pay bo-
nuses according to the set targets as outlined in the di-
rectives from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare?
Change in health worker behaviour
Although the payments ended up not being performance
based, health workers were told that they would be, and
they responded to the intervention much as the theory
predicts that they would: They increased effort in areas
where they would receive payments (with a focus on
quantity), while strategies to improve the quality of care
(for which they were not rewarded) appear to have been
largely ignored. Similar results were also reported in a P4P
impact evaluation study on maternal and child health in
Rwanda where the highest improvements in indicators
were observed for those indicators with the highest ex-
pected payment [12].
Health workers reported numerous strategies to attract
women to the clinics. One of the strategies they reported
was to offer better services, educating women about the
benefits of delivering at a clinic and positive attitudes to-
ward women attending the clinic. The use of positive
strategies to persuade women to give birth at clinics may
certainly increase the number of facility births as some
studies in Tanzania have found negative staff attitudes to
be among the barriers against facility deliveries [36,37].
Chimhutu et al. BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:23 Page 9 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/23However, attracting more women to deliver at facilities
does not necessarily ensure that the clinical quality of
care is high. Due to the difficult circumstances under
which many health workers work - lack of equipment,
medication, and skills [38] - it may be difficult to deliver
high-quality care even if they want to. In fact, prior to
the intervention, health workers were afraid that they
would not be able to deliver a high quality of care due to
a lack of equipment.
Health workers not only engaged in positive strategies
to induce women, coercive strategies were also employed,
and these strategies were copied between clinics. While
other studies have noted that incentive structures may
entail coercive strategies, [39,40], to our knowledge, our
study is the first to identify coercive practices against
home birth in connection with a P4P scheme in Tanzania.
Health workers threatened to fine women who did not
give birth at a facility or to withhold vaccinations and/or
clinical cards for babies who had been born at home.
While health workers in Mvomero claim that the threats
were meant to “scare” people and that they have not been
carried out in actual practice, the district health adminis-
tration argue that these threats may have kept women
from coming to the clinic for postnatal care and vaccina-
tions of their babies after having delivered at home, be-
cause they were afraid of being fined.
The effectiveness of both positive and coercive strat-
egies on health outcomes crucially depends on the qual-
ity of care offered, which was not directly targeted by
the intervention. During our fieldwork in 2011, a woman
died of untreated eclampsia because the medical attend-
ant at the dispensary where the woman came to give
birth did not recognize the signs of preeclampsia. Since
poor quality may be an explanation for why women
choose not to deliver at the clinic, health workers could
potentially improve the quality to attract more women.
However, if health workers offer a low quality care be-
cause they are unable to deliver a high quality, coercive
strategies forcing women to deliver at the clinic may be
perceived as the only strategy they have at hand. Such
strategies need not improve health outcomes.
Observe that even if health workers reported that they
had implemented various strategies to attract women to
the clinics, the strategy that would involve the least
amount of effort would be to forge the numbers. Before
health workers received payments, they were worried that
a convenient strategy to fulfill the delivery indicator would
be to forge the numbers. After having received the P4P
payments, however, health workers were adamant that this
did not take place. Certainly, health workers had a vested
interest in making this argument. An assessment of the
donor-funded pilot undertaken in the Pwani Region sug-
gests that verification and data validation has been a prob-
lem and that forging has indeed taken place [41].Why wasn’t P4P implemented in the way that it was
designed?
Contrary to the directives from the Ministry of Health,
the district administration ended up paying bonuses to
all facilities at a flat rate, which means of course that the
payments were not performance based. The district ad-
ministration’s explanation for giving a flat rate was that
all health facilities did well in at least one indicator, and
that they would be “stricter” if P4P was to be continued.
In our view, two factors were behind this decision.
First, as documented in an appraisal study commis-
sioned by donors in 2009, the Health Management
Information System (HMIS) in Tanzania is too weak to
handle a proper monitoring of a P4P programme [2]. A
weak health infrastructure has been identified as one of
the major threats to the effectiveness of P4P [40]. We
witnessed that the health administrators in Mvomero
were too busy with other work to take on the additional
burden of monitoring P4P. Hence, for an under-resourced
district such as Mvomero, monitoring P4P with the help
of the district’s own resources probably proved impossible.
Second, the district administration argued that a flat
rate was given since the P4P initiative was to be a finan-
cial motivation (motisha) for the health workers, and
that all had done well with at least one indicator. Under
P4P, health workers are rewarded for a change in indica-
tors. The extent of change a single facility is able to
achieve will be a function of factors both inside and out-
side health worker control. For a variety of reasons, some
facilities will find it difficult to increase the utilization of
services (i.e. long distances/lack of transport, strong pref-
erences for home birth among the local population, etc.),
while others may find it easier. In clinics where the know-
do gap is high and low utilization is explained in part by a
low motivation, there may be a high potential for achiev-
ing an increase in indicators.
The extent to which bonus payments are perceived as
fair – even in cases where they depend upon factors that
are partly outside the control of the health workers - de-
pends upon the type of fairness principle that prevails in
a particular culture. Based on different ideas about what
individuals should be held responsible for, notions of
fairness can be divided into two broad categories: liber-
tarianism and egalitarianism [42]. According to libertar-
ianism, performance-based incentives will be viewed as
fair since individuals receive payments based on how
they perform in relation to a predefined target. On the
other hand, according to strict egalitarianism, P4P will
be perceived as unfair since people should not be held
responsible for factors such as talent or other external
aspects outside of their own control. An egalitarian fair-
ness principle may stand strong in socialist societies,
where individual behaviour is believed to be shaped by
society, and inequality as such is a function of an unfair
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the individual. By contrast, in capitalist societies where
ideas of liberalism and libertarianism stand stronger, pay
for performance may be viewed as a fair way to differen-
tiate income, which according to libertarianism should
be distributed in relation to effort and talent (see Nozick
[43] for a defence).
Due to its sociocultural setup and political history,
Tanzania is characterized by an egalitarian mode of
thought. The local government in Mvomero did not
appear compelled to reward good performance and
withhold money if the performance was not optimal; in-
stead, they stated that they wanted to display gratitude
for what they saw as a positive effort. In addition to the
practical limitations mentioned earlier, it is possible that
the social relationships between local policymakers and
health workers made it difficult for the health adminis-
tration to pay some facilities less than others even if
they had not met the set targets.
Because principles of fairness vary across cultures and
countries, P4P may be viewed as fair in some places,
while being perceived as deeply unfair in other settings.
The literature reports a number of cases where health
workers are demotivated by P4P programmes because
the rewards are perceived as being unfairly allocated
[40]. When we told our informants that the bonuses had
been given at a flat rate that disregarded actual perform-
ance, none of them argued that this was unfair; nor did
informants contest the practice of distributing the bonus
equally to all staff members at the facility. One reason
for this may be that we focused on nurses. There is the
possibility that medical doctors at the three hospitals in
the district would have expressed more negative atti-
tudes toward a system where they receive the same bo-
nuses as non-clinical staff.
If it is correct that an egalitarian fairness principle shaped
the way that the locally funded P4P was implemented, then
P4P may work very differently when implemented by local
agents compared to when it is implemented by external
entities. The donor-sponsored P4P in the Pwani Region is
being piloted and led by professional external agents.
Based on our experience from the locally funded P4P in
Mvomero, we expect that the intervention may work
very differently if/when it is taken over by the govern-
ment in its entirety.
Our study has a number of implications for the design
of P4P in Tanzania and other low-income contexts, and
for the studies of such schemes. Firstly, contextual factors
affect the nature and operation of a P4P scheme (such as
a country’s sociocultural context) and it is therefore
important for these factors to be taken into account dur-
ing the design to achieve sustained results. Secondly, in
cases where a P4P design is supply-side oriented (such as
the Tanzanian case), there is need to accommodate andpromote community views and participation in order to
safeguard against coercive practices. Thirdly, our study to
a certain extent implies that P4P is prone to adverse ef-
fects when introduced in a context where systems con-
straints are substantial. Finally, the above points suggest
that studies of P4P impact on beneficiaries should not
only measure utilization of services, but include both
health outcomes and a qualitative element, as paying for
increased utilization does not necessarily improve health
outcomes.Study limitations
Our study has a number of limitations. Firstly, only three
of the 26 health workers we interviewed for this study
were interviewed both before and after the bonus pay-
ments were made contrary to the original design. This was
due in part to the fact that some of the health workers
interviewed in 2010 had moved or were absent during our
visit in 2011. Another reason was that we wanted better
geographical representation, and therefore decided to cover
a larger area for our 2011 interviews in order to capture
local variations within the district (i.e. the type of sanctions
that had been introduced against home birth). Lastly, study
informants were purposively selected and may not be rep-
resentative of other individuals or settings, hence the study
lacks external validity.Conclusion
Many scholars have argued that P4P may have adverse
effects. This study has contributed to this body of litera-
ture by showing how health workers in a low-income
setting use coercive strategies in order to reach set targets
for deliveries. While P4P in Mvomero may have contrib-
uted to an increase in the number of institutional deliver-
ies, the overall health outcomes may not have been
positive. Our study has also demonstrated that qualitative
studies of P4P interventions should preferably include
both community and health worker components since in-
formation from community members may be essential in
order to ask health workers the right questions – and vice
versa. The study has also demonstrated that the P4P
programme deviated substantially from the original design
when implemented by local authorities – partly due to
limited resources, and partly due to fairness ideals that dif-
fer from the basic principles of P4P. This lesson is most
likely relevant for the nationwide roll-out of P4P pro-
grammes in other African countries.
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